Let G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a pseudorandom generator. We say that a circuit implementation of G is (k, q)-robust if for every set S of at most k wires anywhere in the circuit, there is a set T of at most q|S| outputs, such that conditioned on the values of S and T the remaining outputs are pseudorandom. We initiate the study of robust PRGs, presenting explicit and non-explicit constructions in which k is close to n, q is constant, and m >> n. These include unconditional constructions of robust r-wise independent PRGs and small-bias PRGs, as well as conditional constructions of robust cryptographic PRGs.
Introduction
Pseudorandomness is a central tool in complexity theory and cryptography. A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic function G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m which stretches a short random seed into a longer output which looks random to any computationally bounded distinguisher. The question we ask in this work can be pictorially described as follows. Consider an implementation of G by a boolean circuit, and suppose that an attacker can observe a set S of k wires anywhere in the circuit. Since S may contain output wires, the output conditioned on S may no longer look random. But how big is the "shadow" S can cast on the output? Can we design PRG implementations in which the effect of observing any such S is localized to roughly k bits of the output?
We formalize the above question via the notion of robust pseudorandom generators. We say that a circuit implementation of G is (k, q)-robust if for every set S of at most k wires anywhere in the circuit there is a set T ("shadow") of at most q|S| outputs such that conditioned on the values of S, the outputs outside T are pseudorandom. We will be mainly interested in a stronger notion of robustness in which the conditioning is on both S and T ; if such a stronger requirement is met we say that G is strongly (k, q)-robust. We consider the robustness of three distinct types of PRG: r-wise independent PRGs, where the distinguisher can observe any r bits of the output, small-bias PRGs [41] , where the distinguisher can compute the parity of any subset of the outputs, and cryptographic PRGs [15, 47] , where the distinguisher can perform arbitrary polynomial-time computations.
To motivate the notion of robust PRGs, consider a simple application of cryptographic PRGs for one-time symmetric encryption. To encrypt a long message M ∈ {0, 1} m with a short secret key K ∈ {0, 1} n , it suffices to compute C = M ⊕ G(K). Since G(K) is indistinguishable from random, so is C. Now, suppose that k << n intermediate values in the computation of C are leaked. What do these values together with C reveal about M ? The dense model theorem [46, 44, 23] assures us that if G is sufficiently strong, then M is indistinguishable from some source whose min-entropy is roughly m−k. However, even a single lost bit of entropy can correspond to global information about m. For instance, if an intermediate value reveals the parity of G(K), this information together with C reveals the parity of M . Our goal is to provide the guarantee that if arbitrary k physical bits are leaked during the process of computing C, this is no worse than leaking (roughly) k physical bits of M .
We turn to the question of constructing robust PRGs, starting with some simple observations. First, if k = n, the set S can include the entire PRG seed, conditioned on which the entire output is fixed. We thus restrict the attention to the case where k < n. Second, allowing n to be much bigger than k, we can use the following naïve construction: if G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a PRG then G : {0, 1} n (k+1) → {0, 1} m defined by G(x 1 , . . . , x k+1 ) = G (x 1 )⊕G (x 2 )⊕· · ·⊕G (x k+1 ) (computed in the natural way) is a strong (k, 1) robust PRG. The main weakness of this construction is that its seed length is far from optimal. A secondary weakness, which turns out to be crucial for one of our motivating applications, is that the circuit size of G is much bigger than its output length. Our main goal in this work is to construct robust PRGs in which n is very close to k, while keeping q constant and maximizing the stretch function m(n). As a secondary goal, we would like to minimize the circuit size of robust PRGs. These goals are nontrivial to meet also when considering non-explicit constructions.
Our Results
We present several constructions of robust PRGs with near-optimal parameters. These include:
• Robust r-wise independent PRGs: Using explicit constructions of unbalanced lossless expanders [19, 28] , we get constructions of strong (k, q)-robust r-wise PRGs with q = O(1) and either r, k = Ω(n) and linear stretch, or r, k = n 1−η and arbitrary polynomial (or even exp(n δ )) stretch, for an arbitrary constant η > 0. For randomized (non-explicit) constructions, we can get an arbitrary polynomial stretch with r, k = Ω(n).
• Robust -biased PRGs: We get an explicit construction of a strong (k, q)-robust -biased PRG with q = O(1), k = Ω(n), linear stretch, and exponentially small bias. We also get a randomized construction with a small polynomial stretch which satisfies the weaker notion of robustness.
• Robust cryptographic PRGs: PRG constructions with constant output and input locality [9, 10, 8, 7] yield (n, q)-robust PRGs with linear stretch and q = O(1). Concretely, any PRG is (n, q)-robust where q is the product of the input and output locality. We show that a cryptographic PRG from [9] , which has linear stretch, is (Ω(n), q)-robust with q which is smaller than the input locality (under a similar intractability assumption).
The output locality of the above PRGs (i.e., the number of inputs on which each output depends) is at most polylogarithmic in the seed length, and their circuit size is at most quasilinear in the output length. As discussed above, robust PRGs can be directly motivated by their usefulness as a more resilient alternative to traditional PRGs. We present several other applications of (strong) robust r-wise independent PRGs in cryptography. The high level idea behind these applications is as follows. Suppose that a cryptographic computation, which has secret inputs w and secret randomness ρ, is attacked by an adversary who can observe intermediate values in the computation. Whenever it is guaranteed that the adversary's view depends only on a small number of bits from ρ (but can arbitrarily depend on w), we can replace the true randomness ρ by pseudorandomness generated using a robust r-wise independent PRG without degrading the security of the implementation. Note that robustness is necessary here because the PRG computation becomes a part of the new implementation and hence it is also subject to attacks. We apply this idea in the following domains.
Private circuits. A t-private circuit [34] is a randomized circuit which transforms a randomly encoded input into an encoded output while providing the guarantee that the joint values of any t wires reveal nothing about the input. We show that any t-private circuit in which each wire depends on at most bits of randomness can be converted into a t private circuit that uses roughly t bits of randomness via the use of robust r-wise PRGs. Applying this to a variant of the construction from [34] , we get a general construction of t-private circuits which can use O(t 3 ) bits of randomness to protect an arbitrary poly(t)-time computation.
Secure multiparty computation. We show a similar application of robust r-wise PRGs in the related context of unconditionally secure multiparty computation. Here we improve on the randomness complexity of a previous randomness-efficient protocol from [18] , which implicitly relies on the naïve robust PRG construction described above.
Secure two-party computation. We obtain a constant-round two-party computation protocol secure against malicious parties in which evaluating a circuit of size s with security 2 −κ requires only a polylogarithmic (in κ, s) number of calls to a cryptographic PRG for each gate of the circuit, where κ is a security parameter, and a small number of oblivious transfers. In fact, our protocol is non-interactive in a model that allows parallel oblivious transfers. This improves over previous constant-round protocols which combine Yao's garbled circuit construction with a "cut-and-choose" technique (e.g., [38] ), where the number of PRG calls per gate is O(κ). This also improves over a previous protocol from [32] in which the number of PRG calls is similar to our protocol but the number of oblivious transfers is very large (comparable to the number of PRG calls). The improvement over [32] results from implementing randomized circuits of a near-optimal size which use a small amount of randomness to make any disjunction of circuit wires or their negation essentially independent of the input. For this application, the crucial feature of our robust PRG constructions is their near-optimal circuit size rather than seed length.
Related Work
It is instructive to view the question we study in the broader context of leakage-resilient cryptography. The general goal in this area is to get an implementation of a cryptographic function (say, a PRG or an encryption scheme) which remains "as secure as possible" in the presence of information leakage. One way of classifying works in this area is according to the following criteria:
• What is the class of leakage functions? One may consider either (A) local leakage, where the adversary can probe k physical bits in the implementation, or (B) global leakage, where the adversary can learn arbitrary k bits of information.
• Which parts of the system leak? Here one can consider either (1) confined leakage, which applies only to part of the implementation (e.g., a secret key, a seed, or an online phase), or (2) unconfined leakage, where the leakage applies to the entire implementation.
In case (1) one can hope to offer full protection against leakage, whereas in case (2) one needs to settle for allowing a similar type of leakage in the "ideal model." That is, if arbitrary k bits of information can be leaked, the best we can hope for is that the adversary will learn k bits of information of the same type about the secrets.
Most work on leakage resilient cryptography falls either into category (B1) (e.g., [12, 23, 2, 42, 27] ), (A1) (e.g., [45, 17, 34] ), or (B2) (e.g., [29, 25, 13] ). Our work may be the first to study nontrivial questions of type (A2).
We conclude by comparing our notion of robust PRGs with other notions of robustness for PRGs considered in the literature. An exposure resilient function (ERF) [17] is a PRG whose output remains pseudorandom even if k physical bits of the seed (and the seed alone) are leaked. Thus, ERFs can be classified into category (A1). An ERF can be obtained by applying a standard PRG on top of an extractor for bit-fixing sources [20] . A natural approach for constructing a robust PRG from an ERF is to apply a private circuit compiler (such as [34] ) to the ERF. This approach fails because of the high randomness complexity of private circuits. Even if one uses the randomness-efficient private circuits mentioned above, the parameters of the resulting robust PRG will end up being worse than those obtained by taking the exclusive-or of k + 1 standard PRGs. Finally, the dense model theorem (already mentioned above) implies that any sufficiently strong cryptographic PRG offers leakage resilience of type (B2). That is, leaking arbitrary k bits of information about the seed is not much worse than leaking roughly k bits of information about the output.
Organization. In Section 2 we give an informal overview of our techniques. In Section 3 we give formal definitions for different variants of robust PRGs. Section 4 describes our constructions of robust PRGs and Section 5 describes applications of robust r-wise PRGs in cryptography.
Overview of the Techniques
In this section we sketch the techniques used in our constructions. At a very high level, we achieve robustness in all of our PRGs by constructing local PRGs. A local PRG is a PRG such that each output bit depends on only a small number of input bits (say d bits). Therefore, we can implement our PRGs using circuits with small locality (such as NC 0 circuits). In such an implementation, if the value of a wire is leaked to an adversary, it is no worse to assume that instead of the wire, the adversary learns the values of some d input bits. Thus, if k wires are leaked, then it is no worse to assume instead that kd input bits are leaked. We then show that our constructions are robust against the leakage of input bits. We now give more details below.
Robust r-wise independent PRG
Limited independence has found many applications in computer science, which motivated several efficient constructions of PRGs whose outputs have limited independence. A construction from [?], based on expander graphs, has the small locality property that we need. Specifically, assume that we have a bipartite expander graph with left degree d, such that any subset of v ≤ vertices on the left has at least 3 4 vd neighbors on the right. Such an expander with vertex expansion > d/2 is called a unique neighbor expander. Now associate the left vertices with the output bits and the right vertices with the input bits. It is well known that the PRG obtained by computing each output bit as the xor of its neighbors is an r 1 -wise independent PRG for r 1 = .
We show that the above construction is also a robust r-wise independent PRG for some r = Ω(r 1 ). Specifically, we show that whenever we fix a subset of vertices S on the right with |S| not too big, there exists a subset of vertices T on the left with |T | not too big, such that the induced graph on vertices outside of S ∪ T is still a unique neighbor expander. Therefore, even conditioned on any fixing of the input bits in S, the output bits outside of T are still r-wise independent for some r.
To show this, the rough idea is as follows. We let T be the set of vertices which have a large fraction of neighbors in S. Then |T | is small because otherwise T will not have sufficient expansion. Now for any subset of vertices V on the left with V ∩ T = ∅ and |V | ≤ − |T |, V must have many neighbors inS (the vertices on the right not in S), since by expansion V ∪ T has many neighbors, while on the other hand the neighbors of T are fairly concentrated in S. This gives our robust r-wise independent PRG.
Next, we show that the above construction is in fact a strong r-wise independent PRG. The rough idea is as follows. Ideally, we want to show that the output bits outside of T are still r-wise independent even conditioned on any fixing of the input bits in S, and any fixing of the output bits in T . However, this may not be true. If this is not true, then by the XOR lemma there must exist a subset W of output bits with W ∩ T = ∅ and |W | ≤ r, such that the xor of the bits in W is not uniform. Since all output bits are linear functions of the input bits, this implies that there exists a subset U ⊂ T such that the xor of the bits in U is always equal to the xor of the bits in W (or always equal to the complement of the xor). This can only happen if the unique neighbors of W form a subset of the union of S and the neighbors of T . Now we can do the following process. Initialize T to be the empty set and if there is a non-empty subset T of vertices with T ∩ T = ∅ and |T | ≤ r that has a large fraction of unique neighbors in S ∪ Γ(T ), we let T = T ∪ T . We repeat the above process until there is no such T left. Since the graph is finite the process always terminates in finite steps. We then use techniques similar to those in [4] to show that the size of T is not too big. Then, any subset W outside of T with |W | ≤ r will have many unique neighbors outside of S ∪ Γ(T ), and therefore even conditioned on the fixing of the input bits in S and the output bits in T , the xor of the output bits in W is still uniform.
Robust -biased PRG
Our robust -biased PRGs are obtained by xoring the output of our robust r-wise independent PRG with the output of another PRG (which uses an independent seed). We give two constructions. The first is an explicit strong robust PRG with linear stretch, or larger stretch with smaller robustness, and the second is a randomized robust PRG with polynomial stretch. Note that an -biased PRG must fool a linear test with any size. Our first observation is that the robust r-wise independent PRG described above already fools linear test with size at most r. Thus, the other PRG only needs to fool linear tests with large size.
For the strong robust -biased PRG, we construct the other PRG as follows. We take a seed with n bits and divide it evenly into n/c blocks, where each block contains c bits, for some constant c > 1. Now we use each block as a seed and apply a known construction of -biased PRG, such as those in [41, 5] . The PRG can stretch c bits into 2 Ω(c) bits with bias 2 −Ω(c) . Now we take the concatenation of the outputs for all blocks as the output. This construction indeed also has small locality as fixing k wires is no worse than fixing k blocks of input bits. Moreover, even conditioned on the fixed input bits and the corresponding output bits, the xor of any > r of the remaining output bits has bias of at most 2 −Ω(r) . In other words, this PRG is itself a strong robust -biased PRG for linear tests with large size. Thus when xored with our strong robust r-wise independent PRG, we obtain a strong robust -biased PRG.
For our randomized robust PRG with polynomial stretch, we take the other PRG as the randomized construction in [8] . Specifically, there the authors showed that one can take a randomized bipartite graph with n 1+δ left vertices, n right vertices and left degree d for some constant d > 0, and associate the left and right vertices with output bits and input bits respectively. Now, if each output bit is computed by applying a non-degenerate predicate P to its neighbors, then the graph gives an -biased PRG with = exp(−n Ω(1) ). We show that their construction can be adapted to our case. More specifically, if we again take the randomized graph, and now let each output bit be computed by applying an appropriate polynomial P to its neighbors, then the graph gives a robust -biased PRG with = exp(−n Ω(1) ) for linear tests with large size. Thus when xored with our robust r-wise independent PRG, we obtain a robust -biased PRG.
Robust cryptographic PRG
Here we give a high level sketch of our robust cryptographic PRG, under a computational assumption.
The assumption is one made in [3, 9] , and the construction is essentially the same construction as the linear stretch cryptographic PRG in [9] . Specifically, take a bipartite expander graph with n right vertices such that any subset of left vertices with size at most , for = ω(log n), has vertex expansion c for some constant c > 1. Associate the left and right vertices with output bits and input bits respectively. Compute each output bit as the xor of its neighbors. The assumption is that if we xor the output string with a noise vector such that each bit in the vector is the product of a constant number of independent random bits, then the output is indistinguishable from uniform. Note that the noise vector has small locality and moreover, it is (strongly) robust. Thus, if we take the expander graph to be robust as in our construction of robust r-wise independent PRG, then the resulting construction is a robust cryptographic PRG.
However, this PRG does not give us any stretch, since the number of uniform random bits used to produce the noise vector is larger than the output size. To fix this, the authors in [9] use another fresh random seed to apply an extractor to the random bits used to generate the noise vector, and concatenate the output of the extractor to the output of the above PRG. Their extractor is obtained by xoring an -biased distribution with the the random bits used to generate the noise vector, and the output of the extractor can be shown to be statistically close to being uniform and independent of the output of the PRG. Note that the random bits that are used to generate the noise vector are themselves (strongly) robust. Furthermore, we can show that conditioned on the leakage of a small number of wires and the fixing of the noise vector, these bits still have a lot of entropy. Thus if we take the -biased distribution to be the output of our robust -biased PRG, we get a robust cryptographic PRG.
We leave open the question of constructing strong robust cryptographic PRGs with good parameters. In particular, such constructions need to resist the type of reconstruction algorithms considered in [16] .
On the distinction between robustness and strong robustness. One might think that a robust PRG is always also a strong robust PRG with some modest loss in parameters. This is not the case. The following simple example provides a separation between the two notion in the cases of small bias and cryptographic PRGs. Take a (weakly) robust PRG G and add a dummy gadget computing the xor of all output bits.
The resulting PRG is still weakly robust with k = 1: if we let S include any single wire of the dummy gadget and T be one of the output bits on which C S depends, then YT is indistinguishable from uniform conditioned on C S . However, letting S contain the output of the dummy gadget, there is no output bit T such that YT conditioned on S and T is pseudorandom.
Definitions
In this section we define the different notions of robust PRGs we will be interested in. First, U n denotes the uniform distribution on n bits; if n is understood we sometimes use U . We will need the following notion of "fooling" with respect to functions of varying input lengths. Definition 1. Let F = n F n be a class of functions, where the functions in F n are from {0, 1} n to {0, 1}. A probability distribution D on {0, 1} n is said to -fool F if for any f ∈ F n ,
Definition 2.
A circuit implementation C of a function G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a (k, q)-robust pesudorandom generator (PRG) for a class F of functions with error if the following holds. Let X be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n and Y = G(X). For any set S of at most k wires in G, there is a set T of at most q|S| output bits such that conditioned on any fixing of the values C S of the wires in S, the values YT of the output bits not in T -fools F. We say that G is a strong (k, q)-robust PRG for F if conditioned on any fixing of the values C S and Y T , we have that YT -fools F.
If the implementation is understood or unimportant, we may simply say that a function is a robust PRG. This may happen if each output bit depends on only few input bits, and any implementation that does not involve using extraneous bits is robust.
When each F n consists of all tests on r bits, we call a robust PRG for F with 0 error a robust r-wise independent PRG. When each F n consists of all parities on subsets of the n bits, we call a robust PRG for F a robust -biased PRG. A robust cryptographic PRG is one which is robust for each F that can be computed by circuits of poly(n) size with negligible error (n).
We handle leakage of arbitrary wire values by constructing a local PRG which can handle leakage of inputs. In particular, we have the following definitions and simple lemma.
Definition 4. A function G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a (k, q)-input robust PRG for a class F of functions with error if the following holds. Let X be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n and Y = G(X). For any set S of at most k input bits, there is a set T of at most q|S| output bits such that conditioned on any fixing of the values X S of the inputs S, the values YT of the output bits not in T -fools F. We say that G is a strong (k, q)-input robust PRG for F if conditioned on any fixing of the values X S and Y T , we have that YT -fools F. 
Constructions
In this section, we describe our constructions of robust r-wise PRGs.
Our construction of a robust r-wise independent PRG is simple. A bipartite graph H = ([m], [n], E) induces a function G H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m where the ith output bit is the parity of the input bits corresponding to the neighbors of i. That is, G H (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) where
We will take H to be a bipartite expander with expansion bigger than half the degree. This is defined as follows. We can now state our theorem.
Then for any constant 0 < α < 1, we have that G H is a strong (αγ , 1/γ)-robust r-wise independent PRG, with r = (1 − α) .
One surprising feature of this theorem is that the degree d of the expander does not appear anywhere explicitly. Besides expansion bigger than d/2, the important parameter of the expander is , the maximum size of subsets which expand. The parameter determines the robustness of the PRG. We have ≤ 2n/d, so the degree appears implicitly there.
First we state a result for random d-left-regular graphs H with d ≤ √ n and m = n Ω(d) . In this case, for any γ < 1/2, with probability 1 − n −Ω(d) , the random graph H is an (Ω(n/d), (1/2 + γ)d)-expander, which is essentially best possible. This gives: Theorem 3. There exists β > 0 such that for any d ≤ √ n, for a random d-left-regular H with m = n βd , with probability 1 − n −βd , the function G H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a strong (βn/d, 21)-robust r-wise independent PRG for r = βn.
We now instantiate Theorem 2 with known expander constructions. Capalbo et al. [19] achieved expansion bigger than d/2 for constant degree graphs, with = Ω(n/d). This yields:
Theorem 4. For any constant C > 0 there is a constant β > 0 such that there is an explicit O(1)-local strong (βn, 21)-robust r-wise independent PRG G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} Cn for r = βn.
For larger stretch but lower robustness we use the expanders of Guruswami, Umans, and Vadhan [28] . They achieve = n 1−η for any η > 0, which gives:
To prove the theorem we first prove a lemma about expanders. Proof. Let T be the subset on the left that has the maximum size among all subsets {T } on the left with size at most such that |Γ(T ) \ S| ≤ (d/2 + c/2)|T | (note that T is well defined since T = φ is such a subset). Then we must have |T | ≤ 2|S|/c because otherwise we have
which contradicts the expansion property of H. Next, for any non-empty subset V on the left with V ∩ T = φ and |V | ≤ − |T |, we have
since V and T are disjoint and |V | + |T | ≤ . Thus we must have
Note that this theorem already shows that our construction is a (weak) robust r-wise independent PRG for some r. This is because we can view S in the lemma as the set of input bits that are potentially leaked to the adversary, and the lemma says that there exists a subset T of the output bits such that the induced graph of H outside of S and T is still a unique-neighbor expander. Therefore, the output bits outside of T are still r-wise independent for some r. In the following we prove that the same construction is actually strongly robust, proving Theorem 2.
We show that G H is strongly (dαγ , 1/(γd))-input-robust. Let S be the set of input bits that are fixed with |S| = s ≤ kd ≤ αγd = αc .
We now consider the input bits inS, which are the bits not in S. Let x ∈ {0, 1} n be the input string, and y = G(x) ∈ {0, 1} m be the output string. For any output bit y i we associate with it a vector V i ∈ {0, 1} n . The vector V i has exactly d 1s at the d positions of y i 's neighbors (more precisely, y i 's corresponding vertex's neighbors), and has 0s everywhere else, i.e., V i is the indicator vector of whether an x j influences y i . We then letV i ∈ {0, 1} n−s be the vector that is obtained by projecting V i into the bits that are inS. Let X be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n , and Y = G(X) be the output bits of the PRG. The following fact is immediate.
Fact 7. For any subset W of the output bits, we have
Lemma 8. For any subset W of the output bits, letW be the output bits not in W . Assume that conditioned on some fixing of the input bits {X i ∈ S} and the output bits {Y h ∈ W }, there exist some bits
, and vice versa.
We now prove the other direction. For each X i we associate with it a vector U i ∈ {0, 1} n that has exactly one 1 at the i'th position, and has 0's everywhere else. Let b be the dimension of Span({V h : Y h ∈ W }). Since X is originally the uniform distribution, and every fixing of X i or Y h is a linear constraint, we have that conditioned on all these fixings, X is now an affine source of dimension n − s − b. In other words, there exist n − s − b linearly independent vectors A 1 , · · · , A n−s−b ∈ {0, 1} n and another vector A 0 ∈ {0, 1} n such that
where {Z i } are uniform independent random bits. Moreover, each A i is orthogonal to each (U j :
Note that the X i 's only have 0 outside of the bit positions in S, thus when projected into the bit positions inS, we have thatV =
We now slightly abuse notation and use S to also denote the set of right vertices in H that correspond to the fixed bits. Below we borrow some techniques from [4] . We have the following definition.
be the set of unique neighbors of T , i.e. the set of right vertices that are adjacent to only one vertex in T . For any subset S ⊂ [n] with |S| < c , we define an inference relation S on subsets of the left vertices as follows.
We now set T = ∅ and repeat the following step as long as it is possible: if there exists a non-empty subset
Since the graph is finite the above procedure terminates in finite steps. We denote the final T by Cl(S). We now have the following lemma.
Proof. Assume for the sake of contradiction that |Cl(S)| > |S|/c. Consider the sequence of subsets of left vertices T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T v that we add to the set T . Note that all these T i 's are disjoint. Let
On the other hand, since each time when we add T i to T , the number of unique neighbors in
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 10. Let T = Cl(S). Then conditioned on any fixing of the input bits in S and any fixing of the output bits in T , the output bits that are not in T are r-wise independent, where r = − |S|/c ≥ (1 − α) .
Proof. LetT be the set of output bits that are not in T . Assume that the lemma is not true. Then, for some fixing of the input bits in S and some fixing of the output bits in T , there exist 1 ≤ l ≤ r = − |S|/c output bits
This means that we can add T 1 to T in the procedure where we obtain Cl(S), which contradicts the fact that Cl(S) is obtained when the procedure stops.
Note that |T | ≤ |S|/c ≤ kd/c = k/γ, thus the theorem is proved.
Robust -biased generators
We give two constructions of robust -biased PRGs. The first construction is strong and explicit. It gives linear stretch for linear robustness and bigger stretch for smaller robustness. The second PRG outputs close to n 3/2 bits even for linear robustness. However, it is not explicit (because we don't have an explicit construction of the underlying expander) or strong.
Both constructions start from the observation that a strong robust r-wise independent PRG can handle parities of size at most r. We will xor this PRG with another PRG that handles all larger parities. For robust PRGs, we combine them with the following simple lemma.
For strong robust PRGs, we need the following definition.
Definition 7.
A circuit implementation C of a function G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is a doubly strong (k, q, t)-robust pesudorandom generator (PRG) for a class F of functions with error if the following holds. Let X be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n and Y = G(X). For any set S of at most k wires in G, there is a set T of at most q|S| output bits such that conditioned on any fixing of the values C S of the wires and the values of Y T , and the further fixing of t arbitrary output bits inT , we have that the rest of the bits in Y -fools F.
For example, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 12.
A strong (k, q)-robust r-wise independent PRG is also a doubly strong (k, q, t)-robust (r − t)-wise independent PRG for any t < r. Now, if we take the xor of two doubly strong robust PRGs, then we get a strong robust PRG. Specifically, we have Lemma 13. Suppose G 1 : {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} m is a doubly strong (k, q 1 , kq 2 )-robust PRG for parities of size at most r with error and G 2 : {0, 1} n 2 → {0, 1} m is a doubly strong (k, q 2 , kq 1 )-robust PRG for parities of size more than r with error . Then G : {0, 1} n 1 +n 2 → {0, 1} m given by
We will set n 1 = n 2 = n/2 in both constructions.
First Construction
To handle larger parities, our first construction uses the following well-known constructions ofbiased spaces. Recall that a probability space is -biased if, for any X the parity of a non-empty subset of variables, | Pr[X = 1] − Pr[X = 0]| ≤ , i.e., the deviation from 1/2 is at most /2. Theorem 14. [41, 5] For any > 0 there is an explicit construction of PRG G 0 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m such that the output is -biased and n ≤ 3(log m + log(1/ )). Proof. For any fixing of s ≤ k wires S, let T be the set of at most sm 0 output bits generated by the s or fewer input blocks x i which lead to wires in S. Let T 1 be the set of the other fixed t output bits. Let T 2 be the set of at most tm 0 output bits generated by the t or fewer input blocks x i which lead to the bits in T 1 . Consider any fixing of T ∪ T 1 . Now we analyze any parity on a set R of size at least r not involving the bits of T ∪ T 1 . Some of the bits in R may be in T 2 . However, the number of bits in R that are not in T 2 is at least r − |T 2 | = r − tm 0 . These bits depend on at least v = (r − tm 0 )/m 0 = r/m 0 − t input blocks x i , which are independent of the bits in T ∪ T 2 . Partition these bits into R 1 ∪ . . . ∪ R v accordingly. Then each parity R i has bias (deviation from 1/2) at most 0 /2, so the bias of v independent such parities has bias at most v 0 /2. Since the R i 's are independent of the bits in T 2 , the parity on R also has bias at most v 0 /2.
Theorem 16. For a small enough constant β > 0, for any constant C > 1 there is an explicit strong (βn, O (1))-robust -biased PRG G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} Cn , where = 2 −Ω(n/C) .
Proof. We let
is a constant. We let G 1 : {0, 1} n/2 → {0, 1} Cn be the PRG from Theorem 2 and choose α, γ such that G 1 is a strong (βn, 21)-robust r-wise independent PRG for r = τ n with τ > 25m 0 β (since we only need linear stretch we can achieve = Ω(n) in that theorem). Thus by Lemma 12 G 1 is also a doubly strong (βn, 21, m 0 βn)-robust r -wise independent PRG for r = τ n − m 0 βn. By Lemma 19 G 2 is a doubly strong (βn, m 0 , 21βn)-robust PRG for parities of size at least r with error
Thus by Lemma 13, G is a strong (βn, m 0 +21 = O(1))-robust -biased PRG with = 2 −Ω(n/C) .
We can also achieve larger stretch with smaller robustness.
Theorem 17. For any η > 0 and any s = s(n) < n 1−η , there is an explicit strong (n 1−η /s, s)-robust -biased PRG G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} sn , where = exp(−n 1−η /s).
Proof. We repeat the above proof and let G 1 : {0, 1} n/2 → {0, 1} sn be the PRG from Theorem 2 with the expander graph in [28] that achieves = n 1−η , and G 2 : {0, 1} n/2 → {0, 1} sn be G u,d with 2 d/6 /d = 2s and u = n/(2d).
Second Construction
Next, we construct a robust -biased PRG G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m with m = n 1+δ for some constant 0 < δ < 1. Some of the techniques are borrowed from Applebaum et al [8] . Here we will apply Lemma 11. We now describe G 1 and G 2 . Let H be a d-left-regular ( , 11d/12)-expander with m = n 1+δ left vertices, n/2 right vertices with d > 8, > 2, and every vertex on the right has degree at most 4dn δ . Associate the right vertices with the n/2 input bits, and the left vertices with the m output bits. For G 1 , each output bit is computed as the xor of its neighbors, i.e., G 1 = G H . For G 2 , each output bit is a function P of its neighbors, where P is defined as
Here all operations are in F 2 . Since the graph has left degree d, we can implement the PRG naturally as a circuit G with locality d. We now view each left vertex in the bipartite graph as a hyperedge that contains d vertices (i.e., its neighbors). First we have the following definition. r, l, b)-independence) . Let W be a collection of distinct hyperedges. A subset V ⊆ W of l distinct hyperedges is an (l, b)-independent set of W if the following two properties hold.
Definition 8. [8] ((
1. Every pair of hyperedges (V i , V j ) ∈ V has distance at least 2, namely, for every pair V i = V j ∈ V and W ∈ W,
2. For every V i ∈ V and W = V i in W we have
A graph is (r, l, b)-independent if every set of hyperedges with size at least r has an (l, b)-independent set.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 18. The bipartite graph described above is (r, r/(16d 4 n 2δ ), d/6) independent.
Proof. By the expansion property, every two vertices on the left have at least 11d/6 neighbors on the right. Thus the number of common neighbors is at most d/6. In other words, the intersection of any two different hyperedges has size at most d/6. Thus the second property holds. Now fix any set of r hyperedges. We greedily pick hyperedges into the independent set. Specifically, we insert a hyperedge V into the independent set and remove all the hyperedges W that share some common node with V , and all the hyperedges that share some common node with W . We then iterate the above process. Since each time we remove at most (4d 2 n δ ) 2 hyperedges, we are left with at least r/(16d 4 n 2δ ) hyperedges in the independent set.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Consider the PRG G 2 . For any subset S of the input bits with size s ≤ 5d /24, there exists a subset T of the output bits with size t ≤ 24s/(5d) such that the following holds. Conditioned on any fixing of the bits in S, the xor of any r output bits inT has bias of at most 2 −Ω(r/(2 d/6 d 4 n 2δ )) .
Proof. Let T be the set of output bits which correspond to vertices that have at least 17d/24 neighbors in S. By Lemma 6 (note that c = 5d/12) we have |T | ≤ 2s/c = 24s/(5d). Now any vertex inT has at least d − 17d/24 = 7d/24 neighbors inS. Consider the xor of any r output bits inT . These bits correspond to r hyperedges (W 1 , · · · , W r ). By Lemma 18 there exists an (l, b) independent set (V 1 , · · · , V l ) with l = r/(16d 4 n 2δ ) and b = d/6. Now fix an arbitrary assignment for the input bits inS that are not in any of the V i 's and choose the other input bits inS uniformly randomly. Let σ be the assignment of all fixed input bits (including those in S). Now the xor of the r bits is
where the sum is over F 2 and
Note that the Z i 's are independent, since by the property of the independent set (V i , {W :
is a partition of (W 1 , · · · , W r ). Next, note that for W = V i , we have
is a polynomial of the bits of V i with degree at most b = d/6. On the other hand, since V i has at least 7d/24 > d/6 + 1 bits inS, we have that P (X V i ) is a polynomial of the bits of V i with degree d/6 + 1. Thus, Z i is a non-constant polynomial with degree d/6 + 1. Therefore, Z i takes each value of {0, 1} with probability at least 2 −(d/6+1) . Since Y is the sum of l independent Z i 's, we have that Y has bias of at most 2 −Ω(l/2 d/6 ) = 2 −Ω(r/(2 d/6 d 4 n 2δ )) .
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 20. For any constant 0 < α < 1/2, the circuit G described above is a robust -biased (5α /12, 48/5) PRG, where
Proof. Note that in the expander graph H we have γ = c/d = 5/12. By Theorem 2, G 1 is a (5α /12, 24/5) robust r-wise independent PRG with r = (1 − 2α) . By Lemma 19, G 2 is a (5α /12, 24/5)-robust PRG for parities of size more than r with error 2 −Ω(r/(2 d/6 d 4 n 2δ )) . Thus by Lemma 11, G is a a robust -biased (5α /12, 48/5) PRG, where
When d is a constant, a random bipartite graph with the above size satisfies the properties with high probability. Thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 21. There exists a constant integer d and a constant β > 0 such that for any 0 < δ < 1/2, given a random d-left-regular H with m = n 1+δ , with probability 1 − n −Ω(1) , the construction described above using H as the expander is a (βn, 48/5)-robust -baised PRG with = 2 −n Ω(1) .
Robust cryptographic generators
In this section we show that a variant of an expander-based construction of cryptographic PRGs from [9] , which has constant locality and linear stretch, is also robust under a similar intractability assumption. We now describe the construction.
Let m = m(n) > n be a parameter. Let d 0 , d 1 , d 2 be three integer constants. Take an ( 0 , 3d 0 /4) expander with left vertices [m], right vertices [n], left degree d 0 with m = c 1 n for some constant c 1 > 1 and let M = M n be the adjacency matrix of the graph. Let X be the uniform distribution over n bits. Let µ = 2 −l for some constant l ∈ N. We sample a noise vector of length m such that each bit of the vector is 1 with probability µ. Namely, let Y be the uniform distribution over l · m bits. We compute
. Now take a constant c 2 > 1 and let g : {0, 1} lm/c 2 → {0, 1} lm be the -biased generator in Theorem 16, where the expander graph in that construction is a ( 1 , 3d 1 /4) expander with left degree d 1 and the block size of the second PRG in that construction is d 2 . Since we only need a linear stretch, we can achieve constant degrees d 0 , d 1 and 0 = Ω(n), 1 = Ω(lm/c 2 ) = Ω(n). Let R be the uniform distribution over lm/c 2 bits. Our generator is now defined as
where all operations are in F 2 . Thus G : {0, 1} n+lm+lm/c 2 → {0, 1} m+lm .
We will use the following variant of an assumption from [3, 9] .
Assumption 22. [3, 9]
The assumption has a parameter c ≥ 1. For any constant 0 < µ < 1/2 and m = O(n), let D µ (M n ) denote the distribution of M n X + e, where M n is the (m × n) adjacency matrix defined above, X is a uniform random vector in {0, 1} n and e is a noise vector in {0, 1} m such that each bit is an independent Bernoulli distribution that takes 1 with probability µ. If the bipartite graph is a (ω(log n), c) expander, then
where ≈ means that any circuit with size poly(n) cannot distinguish the two distributions with non-negligible probability.
We rely on the following lemmas.
Lemma 23. [3, 9] For any polynomial m = m(n) and constant 0 < µ < 1/2, and any family {M n } of m × n matrices over
Lemma 24.
[9] Let Y ← U lm and E(Y ) be defined as above. Then
Lemma 25. [6, 26, 22] Let g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} s be an -biased generator, and let X s be a random variable on {0, 1} s with min-entropy at least (1 − δ)s for some δ > 0. Then,
where the vector addition is in F 2 .
We now have the following theorem. Proof. Assume that we fix k 1 wires in M n X +E(Y ) and k 2 wires in g(R)+Y , such that k 1 +k 2 = k. This will influence at most Next, consider the bits in g(R) + Y . We first fix all the bits in M n X + E(Y ). Fixing X has no effect on Y or R. Now let Y be the bits of Y outside of S 1 . Thus Y has at least l(m − k) bits. Note that fixing the bits in T 1 has no effect on Y . By Lemma 24, with probability 1 − e −(2 −l (m−k))/3 = 1 − 2 −Ω(n) over the fixing of the other bits in E(Y ), Y has min-entropy at
Next, by Theorem 16, when we fix k wires in g(R), there is a set T 2 ⊆ [lm] with |T 2 | = O(k) such that the bits in g(R) outside of T 2 are -biased, with = 2 −Ω(lm/c 2 2 ) . LetȲ be the bits of Y outside of
Thus by Lemma 25, the bits in g(R) + Y outside of S 1 ∪ T 2 are -close to uniform, where
Let Ω(lm/c 2 2 ) = blm/c 2 2 for some constant b > 0. Now let
Such constants c 2 and l do exist since δ(l) = 2 −Ω(l) while b/c 2 2 = Θ(1/l 2 ). Thus we have that
Therefore, the output bits outside of
At the same time, the input length of the G is n + lm + lm/c 2 = (lc 1 + c 1 /2 + 1/2)n while the output length is (l + 1)m = (lc 1 + c 1 )n. Since c 1 > 1 the generator has a linear stretch. Note that c 0 does not depend on the input locality d so we can make c 0 < d.
Finally, note that d = O(1), since d is the maximum of d 0 + l and 1 plus the input locality of g.
Remark 27. We note that any cryptographic PRG where every output bit depends on only d input bits and every input bit influences only c output bits can be easily shown to be (k, cd)-robust. The cryptographic PRG in [9] can be made to have constant c and d, thus it also has a constant q. However, our construction has two advantages. First, by using a strong robust -biased PRG as in Theorem 16, the g(R) + Y part of our construction can already be shown to be strongly robust. Since the M n X + E(Y ) part also has some strongly robust property (e.g., M n X actually gives a strong robust r-wise independent PRG), our construction serves as a good candidate for a strong robust cryptographic PRG. Second, if we only wish to achieve a (weak) robust cryptographic PRG, then in the g(R) + Y part we can use the (weak) robust -biased PRG as in Theorem 20 with a linear stretch. In this way we obtain a (k, q)-robust cryptographic PRG with q = c 0 < d, while the trivial argument gives q = cd = O(d 2 ).
Applications
As noted in the introduction, robust cryptographic PRGs can be directly motivated by standard cryptographic applications of PRGs such as symmetric encryption. In this section we present several applications of robust r-wise PRGs in cryptography. First, we show how to apply robust PRGs towards reducing the randomness complexity of private circuits and protocols for informationtheoretic secure multiparty computation. We then rely on the low circuit size of robust PRGs towards improving the "black-box complexity" of constant-round secure two-party computation.
The following technical lemma captures a typical application scenario in which a strong robust r-wise PRG is used to replace a true source of randomness in cryptographic implementations in which the adversary has a local view of the randomness. The security of this approach will follow by showing that the view of any wire-probing adversary who attacks the "real world" implementation, in which a robust PRG is used to generate randomness, can be simulated given the view of a wireprobing adversary who attacks an ideal implementation which uses a true source of randomness. To simplify notation, we will use G to denote both the function computed by a robust PRG and its circuit implementation.
Lemma 28. Let λ be a positive integer and G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a strong (k, q) robust r-wise PRG with r ≥ max(λ, kq). Then, for any set S of at most k wires in G, there is a set T ⊆ [m], |T | ≤ q|S|, and a randomized algorithm Sim (a simulator) such that the following holds. For every Q : {0, 1} m → V which depends on at most λ bits of its input, the distributions Real and Sim(Ideal) are identical, where Real = (Q(G(X)), G S (X)), Ideal = (Q(R), R T ), X is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} n , and R is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} m . Moreover, if G is linear over the binary field then Sim can be implemented in probabilistic polynomial time.
Proof. We let T be the set corresponding to S in Definition 2. The simulator Sim, on input (v, ρ T ), samples a uniformly random x such that G T (x ) = ρ T (where G T denotes the T -outputs of G) and outputs (v, G S (x )). Note that Sim can be implemented efficiently when G is linear. We prove that, when (v, ρ T ) are distributed according to (Q(R), R T ), the output of Sim is distributed as Real.
Since r ≥ kq ≥ |T |, the above sampling is well defined and (X, G T (X)) ≡ (x , R T ). Hence also
Let L ⊆ [m] denote the subset of bits of R on which Q(R) depends. Since r ≥ λ ≥ |L|, it follows from the strong robustness of G that G L\T (X) is uniform and independent of (G S (X), G T (X)). Hence,
where [Z | E] denotes the distribution of Z conditioned on the event E. Combining (1) and (2), we get
and hence
as required.
Lemma 28 provides a general recipe for reducing the randomness complexity of cryptographic implementations in which the adversary's view depends on at most λ bits of randomness (but potentially also on many bits of secret data). In the next sections, we give several examples for such applications.
Private circuits
A t-private circuit is a randomized circuit which transforms a randomly encoded input into a randomly encoded output while providing the guarantee that the joint values of any t wires reveal nothing about the input. (For simplicity we address here the stateless variant of private circuits with encoded inputs and outputs, see [34, Section 3] and [1, Section 2.1]; a similar result applies to other variants as well.) We will show that robust r-wise PRGs can be used to reduce the randomness complexity of private circuits in which each wire depends on few bits of the randomness. The latter feature can be enforced by adding a simple "rerandomization gadget" to existing constructions.
Definition 9. (Private circuit)
A private circuit for f : {0, 1} n i → {0, 1} no is defined by a triple (I, C, O), where
• I : {0, 1} n i → {0, 1}n i is a randomized input encoder;
• C is a randomized boolean circuit with inputŵ ∈ {0, 1}n i , outputŷ ∈ {0, 1}n o , and randomness ρ ∈ {0, 1} m ;
• O : {0, 1}n o → {0, 1} no is an output decoder.
We say that C is a t-private implementation of f with encoder I and decoder O if the following requirements hold:
• Correctness: For any input w ∈ {0, 1} n i we have Pr[O(C(I(w), ρ)) = f (w)] = 1], where the probability is over the randomness of I and ρ.
• Privacy: For any w, w ∈ {0, 1} n i and any set P of t wires in C, the distributions C P (I(w), ρ) and C P (I(w ), ρ) are identical.
We say that C makes an -local use of its randomness if the value of each of its wires is determined by its inputŵ and at most bits of the randomness ρ (where the identity of these bits may depend on the wire). Unless noted otherwise, we assume I and O to be the following canonical encoder and decoder: I encodes each input bit w i by a block of t + 1 random bits with parity w i , and O takes the parity of each block of t + 1 bits.
Note that without any requirement on I and O the above definition is trivially satisfied by having I compute a secret sharing of f (w) which is passed by C to the decoder. However, applications of private circuits require the use of encoder and decoder which are independent of f (and are typically smaller than the circuit size of f ).
The following theorem applies robust r-wise PRGs towards reducing the randomness complexity of private circuits.
Theorem 29. Suppose C is a qt-private implementation of f with encoder I and decoder O, where C uses m random bits and makes an -local use of its randomness. Let G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a strong (t, q) robust r-wise PRG with r ≥ t · max( , q). Then, the circuit C defined by C (ŵ, ρ ) = C(ŵ, G(ρ )) is a t-private implementation of f with encoder I and decoder O which uses n random bits.
Proof. We show that the view of an adversary A who attacks C (ŵ, ρ ) by probing a set S of t ≤ t wires in G and a set P of t − t additional wires in C is independent of the input w. Since C is qt-private, it suffices to show that the view of A can be simulated given the view of an adversary A who probes at most qt wires in C(ŵ, ρ).
Let T and Sim be as promised by Lemma 28 for λ = t . For anyŵ, let Qŵ(ρ) = C P (ŵ, ρ). Since C makes an -local use of its randomness, Qŵ depends on at most λ bits of ρ. Thus, for any fixedŵ, we have Sim(Qŵ(R), R T ) ≡ (Qŵ(G(X)), G S (X)), where R is uniform on {0, 1} m and X is uniform on {0, 1} n . It follows that Sim(Q I(w) (R), R T ) ≡ (Q I(w) (G(X)), G S (X)). Since the distribution to which Sim is applied captures the view of an adversary A who corrupts a set P ∪ T of at most qt + (t − t ) ≤ qt wires in C and the distribution on the right hand side captures the view of A , it follows that the view of A is independent of w as required.
Theorem 29 implies that robust PRGs can be used to reduce the question of improving the randomness complexity of private circuits to that of improving their randomness locality. Luckily, known constructions such as the one from [34] , while technically not satisfying the randomness locality condition, can be easily modified to have good randomness locality.
The t-private circuit construction from [34] emulates each gate g of a circuit implementation of f by a gadget which uses O(t 2 ) fresh random bits to compute, given random shares (a 0 , . . . , a t ) of an input a ∈ {0, 1} and (b 0 , . . . , b t ) of an input b ∈ {0, 1}, random shares (c 0 , . . . , c t ) of c = g(a, b). To prevent the randomness used for generating the shares c i from influencing gadgets which use c as an input, one can use the following simple refreshing approach. Generate fresh random bits (r 1 , . . . , r t ) and let r 0 = r 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r t . Compute c 0 = r 0 ⊕ c 0 ⊕ c 1 · · · ⊕ c t (where the latter expression is computed from left to right), let c i = r i for i = 1, . . . , t, and output (c 0 , . . . , c t ) as the new shares of c.
Note that the outputs c i are completely determined by c and the fresh random bits r i , thus ensuring that the randomness used to generate the c i does not influence other gadgets. Moreover, the above gadget does not violate the t-privacy requirement. Applying the above modification to the construction of [34] we get:
Claim 30. Any function f with circuit size s admits a t-private implementation (I, C, O) with the canonical encoder I and decoder O, where C uses O(t 2 s) random bits and makes an O(t 2 )-local use of its randomness.
Combining Claim 30 with Theorem 3 or Theorem 5 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 31. For any polynomial s(·), any function f of circuit size s(t) admits a t-private implementation (I, C, O) with the canonic encoder I and decoder O, where C uses O(t 3 ) random bits (alternatively, O(t 3+ ) random bits for an explicit construction of C from a circuit for f ).
Using a naive implementation of robust PRGs obtained by taking the exclusive-or of k + 1 independent r-wise PRGs would require O(t 4 ) random bits. Improving the randomness locality of private circuits would immediate yield a corresponding improvement to Corollary 31.
An alternative model. While we considered in this section a model of private circuits which receive encoded inputs and produce encoded outputs, the results apply also to an alternative variant in which the inputs and outputs are not protected by an encoder and decoder. In this case one should settle for the following relaxed t-privacy requirement: the distribution of any set of at most t wires in C can be simulated given t bits from the input and output. To apply robust PRGs and get efficient simulation in this context, one needs to use the efficient simulation variant of Lemma 28.
Secure multiparty computation
Private circuits can be viewed as a restricted form of secure multiparty computation, with a large number of parties, each of which is assigned to evaluate a single gate of the circuit. In this section, we consider the more general case where, typically, the number of parties is significantly smaller than the circuit size. The randomness complexity of general t-private computations was studied by Canetti et al. [18] (other works, such as [37, 36, 35, 24, 14] , concentrated on special values of t or on special tasks).
For concreteness, consider the case where k parties, each holding an input bit x i , wish to compute the value f (x 1 , ..., x k ), for some function f . Let C f be a circuit that computes f . The question studied in [18] is the randomness complexity of such protocols. They prove the following: Proposition 32. Let f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be as above, and t ≤ √ k. Then, f can be computed by a t-private protocol P f , using a trusted party which generatesÕ(t 4 · |C f |/k) random bits and with no additional randomness. More concretely, the trusted party picks a random string α from a space of r-wise independent strings of length m =Õ(|C f | · t 2 ), with r =Õ(t 4 · |C f |/k), and then distributes the entries of α between the k parties.
Next, [18] switch to the standard model of secure computation, where no trusted party is available. This is done by letting t + 1 parties each emulate the role of the trusted party by picking a random string from the above space and distributing the bits of the string among the k parties. Then, each of the k parties takes the exclusive-or of the t + 1 strings it received and uses the result as its randomness for the protocol P f . This can be viewed as a naive implementation of a robust PRG that results in a protocol with total randomness complexityÕ(t 5 · |C f |/k). Our goal is to show that, using a better robust r-wise PRG, we can save a factor of t in the randomness, hence achieving in the standard model the same asymptotic randomness complexity as in the case of a trusted party.
The above result of [18] is meaningful only when t ≤ √ k (for larger values of t, the basic BGW protocol is superior). Hence, for convenience, we will focus on the case where k c 1 ≤ t ≤ k c 2 , for some constants c 1 < c 2 < 0.5 and where |C f | ≤ k O (1) .
For a robust r-wise PRG G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , let C G be a circuit evaluating G. In our construction, the size of the circuits is |C G | = O(md) =Õ(m), where d is the locality of G (we have d =polylog(m) in our explicit construction; in the non-explicit case, we can have d = O(1)).
We set m, r to be as in Proposition 32 and n = r 1/(1−η) , as in Theorem 5, with η > 0 being a small constant. We modify the protocol P f of Proposition 32 into a protocol P f as follows: we let the k parties pick ≈ n/k random bits each (if n < k then only n of the k parties pick one uniformly random bit each). Then, the k parties evaluate the circuit C G , where each party is in charge of ≈ |C G |/k of the wires. This means that the party gets the inputs of the corresponding gate and evaluates the wire. Finally, after the m-bit output of G is computed (and each output bit is delivered to the designated party), the k parties execute the protocol P f , using the m-bit output of G as its randomness. During the evaluation of G, each party gets to see the values of O(|C G |/k) of the wires of C G . This means that an adversary who corrupts t of the k parties gets to see a set S of O(t · |C G |/k) wires of C G (this includes the O(t · n/k) input wires that these t parties pick). Using the values of |C G | and m, this isÕ(mt/k) =Õ(t 3 · |C f |/k) wires. The randomness complexity of P f is n = r 1/(1−η) =Õ(t 4 · |C f |/k) 1+ , for some = (η). Since t and |C f | are both polynomial in k, this is justÕ(t 4+ · |C f |/k), for some . The above construction yields:
for some constants c 1 < c 2 < 0.5. Suppose P f is a tprivate protocol for computing f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1}, which uses m random bits and makes an -local use of its randomness, in the sense that the view of any coalition of t parties depends on at most bits of the randomness. Let G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a strong (s, q)-robust r-wise PRG with s =Õ(t 3 · |C f |/k)) and r = max(q · s, ). Then, the protocol P f described above, is a t-private protocol for f which uses n random bits.
The formal proof of security relies on Lemma 28, with X being the uniformly random bits picked in the first stage of P f by n of the parties (assumed to be honest), S is the set of wires in C G that the adversary gets to see, and Q is the view that the adversary sees while executing P f (this information depends on λ =Õ(t 4 · |C f |/k) bits).
As described above, we instantiate Proposition 33 with the protocol P f of Proposition 32 and with the PRG G of Theorem 5 to get the following theorem.
Theorem 34. For any constants 0 < τ < 0.5, c ≥ 1, and > 0 the following holds. If f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} admits a circuit C f of size |C f | = k c then, for t = k τ , f can be computed by a t-private k-party protocol which uses a total of O(t 4+ · |C f |/k) random bits.
Secure two-party computation
In the previous sections, we demonstrated the usefulness of robust r-wise PRGs for reducing the randomness complexity of several cryptographic tasks. In this section we present a somewhat unexpected application of robust r-wise PRGs to the "black-box complexity" of constant-round secure two-party computation. Unlike the previous applications, this application is not very sensitive to the seed length (e.g., the seed length of the naive construction would suffice), but is rather sensitive to the circuit size of the robust PRG, requiring it to be very close to the output length. Since the end result is quite involved and relies on results from previous works, we start by describing the core technical question to which we apply robust PRGs.
Suppose that a function f admits a t-private circuit (I, C, O) where C has size s, uses Ω(s) random bits, and makes a t O(1) -local use of its randomness. We think of s as being a large polynomial in t, much larger than the randomness locality parameter. Our goal here is to reduce the randomness complexity of C without significantly increasing its size. Concretely, we would like to obtain a t -private circuit (I, C , O) for f where t = Ω(t), C uses t O(1) bits of randomness and has size at most s · polylog(t). For this we can combine Theorem 29 with constructions of strong robust t-wise PRGs with polylogarithmic locality. (If we settle for a non-explicit 1 construction, we can make the size of C a constant multiple of s by using a constant-locality robust PRG.) Note that the naive construction of robust t-wise PRGs (taking the exclusive-or of t + 1 independent t-wise PRGs) is unsuitable for this application not because of its randomness complexity but rather because of its circuit size. Using the naive construction would inherently incur an Ω(t) overhead to the circuit size, compared to the desired polylog(t) overhead.
Disjunction-resilient circuits. The application we consider here does not require C (or C ) to be t-private but rather to satisfy a different property: it should be the case that for any subset Z of wires or their negations, the disjunction of the (possibly negated) wires in Z is essentially independent of the input for I. More concretely, define ∆ Disj (Z), the disjunctive distinguishing advantage of Z, by
where Disj Z denotes the disjunction of (possibly negated) wires Z. We say that C is disjunction resilient if for any set of (possibly negated) wires Z, we have ∆ Disj (Z) = 2 −Ω(t) . For |Z| ≤ t, the t-privacy of C ensures that ∆ Disj (Z) = 0. Furthermore, one can ensure via a local randomization gadget from [32] that for any Z we have Pr[Disj Z (C(I(w), ρ)) = 1] ≥ 1 − 2 −Ω(|Z|) . We refer to the latter property as local entropy. Note that the combination of t-privacy and local entropy implies disjunction resilience.
The randomization gadget from [32] increases the size of C by a constant factor. Our goal is, as before, to get a randomness efficient C for f whose size is close to that of C. However, now C should be disjunction resilient rather than private. We show that if C is t-private and has the local entropy property, then the construction of Theorem 29 yields a disjunction resilient C of low randomness complexity and roughly the same size as C. Proof. We use the following case analysis.
• If |Z | ≤ t, then the t-privacy of C implies that ∆ Disj (Z ) = 0.
• If Z involves at least τ wires in the C-part of C , then Pr[Disj Z (C (I(w), ρ )) = 1] ≥ 1 − and hence ∆ Disj (Z ) ≤ . This follows from the fact that for any such Z containing exactly τ wires in the C part, the joint distribution of C Z (I(w), ρ ) is identical to that of C Z (I(w), ρ), and adding more wires (from both the C and G parts) can only increase the probability of the disjunction being equal to 1.
• If Z involves at least τ wires in the G-part of C and at most τ wires in the C part of C , we distinguish between the following two subcases, depending on the dimension dim of the linear space spanned by the parities corresponding to the G-part of Z .
-dim ≤ τ : In this subcase the G wires in Z are determined by at most τ wires from G and at most τ wires from C, implying that ∆ Disj (Z ) = 0 as in the first case.
-dim > τ : In this subcase we have Pr[Disj Z (C (I(w), ρ )) = 1] ≥ 1 − 2 −τ (since the probability is lower bounded by the probability that a random vector in a linear space of dimension dim is nonzero). Thus we have ∆ Disj (Z ) ≤ 2 −τ .
In each of the above cases we have ∆ Disj (Z ) ≤ or ∆ Disj (Z ) ≤ 2 −τ as required.
We combine Lemma 35 with results from [21, 32] and with robust r-wise PRGs to compile any circuit C into a 2 −Ω(κ) disjunction resilient circuit C with poly(κ) randomness complexity, where the size of C is within a polylog factor of the size of C whenever C is much larger than its depth, input, and output size.
Lemma 36. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which given a boolean circuit C(w) and a security parameter κ generates a triple (I, C Disj , O) such that:
• C Disj (ŵ, ρ) is a randomized boolean circuit and I, O are the canonical encoder and decoder with privacy parameter κ.
• C Disj has size s = s · polylog(s) + poly(κ, d, n i , n o ), where d, n i , n o are the depth, input length, and output length of C, respectively.
• C Disj has randomness complexity poly(κ, log s) and randomness locality = poly(κ).
• For any set Z of wires in C Disj or their negations,
Proof. We construct C Disj from C and κ via the following steps. First, similarly to [32] , we use the efficient MPC protocol from [21] to efficiently generate, given C and κ, a κ-private implementation (I, C , O) of size s = s · polylog(κ) + poly(κ, d, n i , n o ) and randomness locality poly(κ). (The randomness locality feature can be obtained via a "refreshing" approach similarly to the one used in Claim 30.) The next step is to inject randomness into C by converting it into a circuit C of size O(|C |) and randomness locality = O( ) which satisfies the local entropy property. This is done by applying the randomization gadget from [32] to each gate of C . More concretely, the circuit C inherits the κ-private of C and has the additional property that for any set Z of (possibly negated) wires and input w, Pr[Disj Z (C (I(w), ρ ) = 1] ≥ 1 − Ω(|Z|). The final step is to apply Theorem 29 with the strong robust r-wise PRGs of Theorem 5 (with q = O(1) and k, r = O(κ)) for reducing the randomness complexity of C while increasing its size by another polylogarithmic factor. By Lemma 35, the resulting circuit C Disj has the disjunction property stated in the last item of the lemma.
We note that by replacing the canonical I, O by more efficient ones, it is possible to remove the dependence of s on n i , n o . Moreover, the entire additive term can be eliminated for almost all "natural" circuits, see [21] for discussion.
Non-interactive secure computation. To describe the final application, we recall the model of non-interactive secure two-party computation (NISC) from [32] . In a NISC protocol for a function f (a, b) there is a receiver holding an input a and a sender holding an input b. The goal is to allow the receiver to learn f (a, b) without learning any additional information about the sender's input b and using as little interaction as possible. We capture the latter requirement by restricting the parties to communicate via a single round of parallel calls to an ideal oblivious transfer (OT) oracle. The sender's input to each OT call is a pair of strings and the receiver's input is a selection bit; the receiver obtains the selected string from each OT call. The joint inputs each party feeds into the OT oracle are obtained by applying a randomized function of its input (depending only on this input and on local, secret randomness), as specified by the protocol.
The security requirements are as follows. First, we require that if both parties follow the protocol, then the receiver learns the correct output f (a, b) . Second, we require the protocol to be secure against malicious parties. That is, the protocol should guarantee that for every receiver strategy there is an effective distribution A over inputs a such that the view of the receiver can be simulated (up to computational indistinguishability) given f (A, b) alone, i.e., without knowing the sender's input b. Moreover, for every sender strategy there is an effective distribution B such that for any receiver input a the receiver's output is statistically close to f (a, B) . We refer to a protocol as above as a NISC protocol for f in the OT-hybrid model.
It was shown in [32] that every f admits a NISC protocol in the OT-hybrid model in which the parties make a black-box use of a cryptographic PRG. This strengthens the classical result of Yao for "honest but curious" parties [48, 39] as well as similar results for constant-round protocols which also make a black-box use of a PRG but require additional interaction [40, 38, 33, 43] .
An interesting question left open by the above line of work is that of minimizing the complexity of NISC protocols, measured by the number of PRG calls and the number of OT calls. In Yao's protocol, the parties only need to invoke the PRG O(1) times for each gate of a boolean circuit computing f . In addition, they invoke the OT oracle n a times, where n a is the length of the receiver's input. To offer security against malicious parties while still making a black-box access to a PRG, previous constant-round protocols employed a "cut-and-choose" approach which required O(κ) PRG calls per gate to guarantee security against a malicious sender 2 with statistical error of 2 −κ .
The approach suggested by [32] to lower the number of PRG calls consists of the following steps:
as its input for Π. Finally, the receiver locally applies the decoder O to the output of Π to compute the output of C.
This approach is instantiated in [32] by using (essentially) the circuit C from the proof of Lemma 36 as C Disj . This circuit has size quasilinear in the size of C, but its randomness complexity is comparable to its size. Thus, while the protocol from [32] makes a polylogarithmic number of PRG calls for each gate of C, it makes a comparable number of calls to the OT oracle. The latter cost may be viewed as prohibitive, as OT is typically much more expensive to implement than a PRG. 3 The randomness efficient version provided by Lemma 36 makes the number of OTs comparable to the receiver's input length (rather than the circuit size) while keeping the number of PRG calls per gate polylogarithmic.
We formalize the above via the following proposition. To simplify notation, we treat f as a concrete function, avoiding an explicit quantification over families of f . When using big-O notation, the hidden constants should be understood to be independent of f . Then, f admits a NISC protocol Π f in the OT-hybrid model with the following features:
• Π f makes n a + n r + O(κ) calls to the OT oracle.
• Π f makes O(s) black-box calls to a (length doubling, cryptographic) PRG and no further use of cryptography.
• Π f is statistically 2 −Ω(κ) secure against a malicious sender.
• Π f is computationally secure against a malicious receiver.
Combining Proposition 37 with Lemma 36 yields the following.
Theorem 38. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given a boolean circuit C(a, b) and a security parameter κ, generates a NISC protocol Π C in the OT-hybrid model with the following features:
• Π C makes n a + poly(κ, log s) calls to the OT oracle, where n a = |a| and s = |C|.
• Π C makes s·polylog(s)+poly(κ, d, n i , n o ) black-box calls to a (length doubling, cryptographic) PRG and no further use of cryptography, where d, n i , n o are the depth, total input length, and output length of C, respectively.
• Π C is statistically 2 −Ω(κ) secure against a malicious sender.
• Π C is computationally secure against a malicious receiver.
Similarly to the discussion after Lemma 36, the additive term in the number of PRG calls can be eliminated when the circuit is sufficiently "regular".
